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ASSESSING RISK IN INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 
Michael Regan1, Jim Smith2, and Peter Love3 
Abstract 
Public private partnerships are a method for the delivery of social and economic infrastructure 
services in over 80 countries worldwide. PPPs are a contractual arrangement between public 
and private entities through which the skills, assets and/or financial resources of both sectors 
are allocated in such a manner that provides optimal service delivery and good value to society. 
Central to the operation of public private partnerships is the systematic evaluation of the 
procurement options available to government, an output specification to encourage private 
design, risk transfer, construction and operational innovation, the detailed analysis of projects 
over their operational life-cycle, a rigorous and competitive bid process, and the selection of 
proposals that deliver value for money. 
Value for money is enhanced with other features of the procurement process. These include the 
selection of projects for PPP delivery that offer scope for risk transfer, the preparation of an 
output specification that creates an incentive framework for sustainable service delivery to 
requirements, governance and approval arrangements, the pre-qualification of contractors, and 
a competitive bid process. Value for money principles enable governments to derive more from 
their public private partnership programs. This paper reviews risk in PPP procurement 
arrangements and considers how it is integrated into a value for money analysis. International 
experience of assessing and managing risk in PPP projects is presented to illustrate the 
dimensions of risk evaluation in various types of projects. 
Keywords: risk, public private partnerships, value for money. 
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1.0 Introduction 
First introduced as part of the Private Finance Initiative in the United Kingdom in the 1990s, 
public private partnerships (PPPs) have come into wider use around the world as an important 
method for government procurement of economic and social infrastructure services. In 
contemporary practice, the PPP is a specialised form of procurement that changes the role of 
government from owner and manager of infrastructure assets to a buyer of infrastructure 
services. PPPs are a method of public procurement that employs a combination of private 
sector capital and management to deliver infrastructure services to, or on behalf of, government 
(Regan 2010). To determine which procurement method is best for government, a comparison 
of the procurement options is undertaken in the early stages of the procurement process. 
Value for Money (VfM) enables government to measure two key dimensions of infrastructure 
procurement. First, it requires government to undertake a detailed ex ante quantitative 
evaluation of a project over its life cycle in order to compare and select the best procurement 
option. Second, with adjustment for risk and competitive neutrality, it provides a means of 
comparing the most efficient procurement mechanism available to government with proposals 
received from contractors in a competitive bid process. In this second application, VfM will also 
take into account the qualitative dimensions of a proposal thereby equipping government with 
the information to make an informed selection of the bid that best meets the service requirement 
contained in the specification, and offers the best financial return. 
There are two important drivers of VfM in PPP contracts. First, the transfer of project and 
service delivery risks from government to the contractor. This may include risks associated with 
construction time and cost, life cycle costing, operations, finance, connectivity to support 
networks, industrial relations and environmental management. These risks are transferred when 
the contractor is in a better position to manage the risk at lower cost than government. Second, 
a competitive bid market also drives VfM because contractors compete on the basis of time and 
price, their experience and efficiency, track record, the innovation that they bring to the 
construction and operational tasks, and the added value that they can bring to the service 
delivery objectives of government. 
2.0 Risk in the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) 
The Public Sector Comparator (PSC) is an estimate of the risk-adjusted, whole-of-life cost of the 
project if delivered by the State.  The PSC is developed according to the same output 
specifications included in the Project Brief and assumes the most likely and efficient form of 
conventional (i.e. non-PPP) delivery by the state. 
The PSC is expressed in terms of the net present cost to the State, calculated using discounted 
cash flow analysis and seeks to take full account of the costs and risks of that method of 
procurement.  The PSC includes amounts to cover the design and construction costs and the 
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maintenance, operation and facilities management costs during the Project Term. The PSC 
plays an important role in the evaluation of proposals and the assessment of VfM. However, its 
accuracy depends on the assumptions used to establish costs, and to identify, measure and 
price risk. The PSC should be robust and consistent with the project scope issued to bidders 
(KPMG, 2011: p. 2). The elements of the PSC are the “base” or “raw” PSC, which is a costing of 
the asset or services under government ownership and management, an adjustment for 
competitive neutrality, the value of risk transferred to the contractor, the risk retained by 
government, and the discount rate. These are shown in Figure 1. 
     
 
Figure 1 Composition of the Public Sector Comparator 
 
2.1 Elements of Public Sector Comparator 
The base PSC provides a costing for delivery of the project as a traditional procurement owned 
and operated by the government, including capital and life cycle costs and delivering services 
over the same period as the proposed term of the PPP and to the standard of service as defined 
in the output specification. The base PSC also includes the following elements in addition to the 
risk elements noted above: 
• An output specification and scope of works; 
• All capital and operating costs associated with building, owning, maintaining and delivering 
the services to the standard required in the specification;  
• The application of discounted cash flow methodology at the recommended discount rate; 
• Adjustments that reflect income from third parties. 
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The costs included in the base PSC are land and development costs, professional fees for 
design and development approvals, building materials, the cost of professional advisers, plant 
and equipment, and raw materials. For the operating period, the costs will include employee 
wages and salaries, consumables, direct management costs and insurance, plant and 
equipment, rates and taxes. The base case PSC is not generally distributed to bidders although 
some policies recommend the agency distribute the base case as a guide to bidders in the 
request for proposal stage (for example, Partnerships Victoria, 2003: p. 9). 
2.2 Competitive Neutrality 
In a competitive market, government holds a number of advantages when bidding against 
private firms. Competitive neutrality is an adjustment that removes the net competitive 
advantage that accrues to a government business because of its public ownership. It is 
designed to recognise material advantage (and disadvantage) that government may hold in 
comparisons with non-government institutions, such as an exemption from stamp duties, 
income and payroll taxes, and the management costs of corporate and other services that 
government may not explicitly recognise such as accounting, human resources and 
administrative services. The purpose of this adjustment is to ensure elimination of competitive 
advantage in a like-for-like comparison of the two estimates. 
2.2.1 Transferable Risk 
The optimal allocation of risk is a key objective of PPP policy and maximising VfM. The decision 
to allocate risk to the contractor depends on whether the bidder is best able to manage the risk 
at least cost. This involves an optimal rather than maximum transfer of risk and requires 
assessment of the contractor’s risk appetite and capacity to mitigate and manage risk 
determined on a case-by-case basis. Transferring risk that the contractor does not have the 
capacity to manage may result in excessive risk premiums being factored into the availability 
payment that contractors will charge government, and diminishing VfM in the process.   
2.2.2 Retained Risk 
This refers to risk retained by government and generally relates to the output specification and 
the core services delivered by government. For example, in a PPP project for a regional 
hospital, it refers to risks associated with the delivery of medical services, the selection and 
training of medical staff and the optimal utilisation of hospital facilities. Retained risk may also 
take into account the cost of insuring assets and operational risks, such as public liability risk 
premiums. Figure 2 shows the components of risk in the PSC and how the bids are managed to 
include the risk components. 
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Figure 2 - Public Sector Comparator 
2.3 The Discount Rate 
The forecasting of future revenue and costs for the PSC or a shadow bid is based on standard 
investment principles and discounted cash flow (DCF) methodology. The DCF requires a cash 
flow forecast, underlying assumptions, initial and residual capital values and a discount rate. 
The selection of a discount rate for government investment is one of the more contentious areas 
of public economics and is essentially a government policy decision. Discount rates may be 
calculated using one of several methods: social time preference (a value calculated for the price 
the community will pay to defer immediate consumption), social opportunity cost (the marginal 
return on investment from alternative state investment opportunities), or a nominated proxy for 
both methods being the marginal cost of state debt (Harrison, 2010). Governments generally 
simplify this process by prescribing the discount rate to be used for public infrastructure 
investment from time to time. 
In OECD countries, the discount rate is generally the marginal cost of government debt, the so-
called risk free rate of the country (HM Treasury, 2011). In other jurisdictions, the discount rate 
may include an adjustment for unsystematic risk, which refers to risks associated with the 
subjective circumstances of the project under consideration, such as supply chain or market 
demand risk. In sub-national jurisdictions, the discount rate may also be adjusted for systematic 
risk, which cannot be eliminated by diversification and affects all investment activity within the 
jurisdiction, such as political and fiscal risks (Partnerships Victoria, 2003). 
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In non-OECD countries, Treasury will generally issue policy directives for agency application of 
investment discount rates. In most countries, this rate is the marginal cost of state debt.  
3.0 Qualitative Analysis  
The qualitative elements of contractor bids may be taken into account when determining VfM 
with PPPs. Typically; these are matters that bring benefits to government, such as unique 
construction technologies, innovation in construction or early completion for accelerated service 
delivery. The qualitative attributes of a contractor proposal that contribute to VfM may be 
complex and difficult to identify and specify in advance. The benefits to government are not 
always similar for different types of projects. The things that deliver qualitative performance 
include early completion of assets and early delivery of services, innovation in design and 
construction methods and materials, better service outcomes, improved capital productivity, 
third party revenue, and the expertise and capacity of the contractor to meet service delivery 
requirements over the life of the project. There are many additional factors that can be taken 
into consideration although this will depend on the particular characteristics of the project being 
procured. In some jurisdictions it may include social impacts such as access and amenity, and a 
public interest test that takes into account factors that are important for both social and 
economic infrastructure services and will generally be reflected in benefits to government not 
available with alternative procurement methods. Some examples from the literature are shown 
in Table 1. 
Table 1: Qualitative Risk Factor Examples 
Qualitative Risk Factors Case Study Examples 
Unquantifiable risk transfer to contractor Berlin Wasser, Germany 
Contractor experience, financial strength, 
expertise and capacity of project lender 
Channel Tunnel Rail Link, United Kingdom 
Desalination Project, Victoria 
Innovative design and construction 
management (example, off-site 
prefabrication) 
Southern Cross Railway Station, Victoria           
Royal Children’s Hospital, Victoria 
User benefits over and above 
specification 
NHS Romford, United Kingdom                       
County Court Building, Victoria 
Service sustainability without subsidy ASA and Rethmann PPP, Hungary 
Complies with a public interest test Eastlink Toll Road, Victoria 
Compliance with new environmental laws Apa Nova Water, Romania 
Improved community access Southern Cross Railway Station, Melbourne 
Access to expertise, efficiency and Apa Novo Water Project, Romania               
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Sources: European Union 2004, National Audit Office 2005; European Commission 2004, 
Resource Book on PPP Case Studies, Directorate-General Regional Policy, Brussels; National 
Audit Office 2005, Improving Public Services through better Construction, HC 364-1, Session 
2004-05, London, March.   
 
Qualitative benefits may take several forms including non-conforming bids that accompany a 
conforming PPP proposal. Examples of qualitative benefits include additional works for a toll 
road project that increased the total distance by several kilometers (Victorian Auditor-General’s 
Office, 2007), creative design work for a new transport interchange complex that improved 
visual and community amenity in its precinct (Victorian Auditor-General’s Office, 2007); new 
school buildings that improved operational flexibility, air quality and sustainability in PFI schools 
(National Audit Office, 2005); contractor use of automated toll collection for a PPP motorway 
which improved traffic flow and trip times for users compared with conventional manual toll 
collection (Victorian Auditor-General’s Office, 2006).  Qualitative evaluation generally follows the 
quantitative assessment of bids. Qualitative factors such as lower user charges, improved 
service quality, improved asset utilisation and early completion may outweigh higher cost to 
government in some cases although the final assessment is best undertaken on a case-by-case 
basis. 
4.0 The Role of Risk in Value for Money 
The primary driver of VfM in PPP projects is the transfer of project risks to private contractors. 
The principle underlying risk transfer is that risk should be borne by the party best able to 
manage the risk which implies the least cost. So, construction risk is best borne by the 
construction contractor and finance risk by the financier(s).  
4.1 What is Risk? 
Risk is any outcome at variance to expectation and is a particular problem with complex 
infrastructure projects in which the likelihood of cost and time overruns is high. In a PPP project, 
risks may include site risks such as pre-existing soil contamination and poor sub-soil stability, 
construction risks such as time and cost overruns and industrial disputes, and life cycle cost 
risk, which is the estimation of all capital and operating expenses to be incurred over service 
technologies not otherwise available to 
government 
Scottish Water Solutions, Scotland                           
Dublin Wastewater Scheme 
Compliance with environmental standards Scottish PPP Water Projects, Scotland 
Technology transfer Berlin Wasser, Germany 
Noise abatement at airports Hamburg International Airport 
Service performance Darent Valley Hospital, United Kingdom 
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intervals of up to 20 years or longer. Risk may have a positive or a negative impact on project 
revenues and costs.  
Most design and construction risks are well known to contractors, form part of the day-to-day 
management of a construction company and are factored into the cost structure of contractor 
bids. However, there are risks that the construction company may be asked to carry under a 
PPP contract that do not form part of their day to day core business, such as project finance 
risk, network, operational and life cycle cost risk. When these risks are allocated to the private 
sector, it is essential that bidders understand the risks that they are accepting, can measure and 
value those risks, and put in place controls for their monitoring, mitigation and management.  
Table 2 shows typical PPP risks at the various stages of the project. 
4.2 Valuing Risk 
Before adjusting the PSC for retained and transferred risk, it is important to develop a risk 
valuation methodology. Risk is central to delivering a successful project and it is measured by 
assessing the probability and cost of an outcome at variance with expectation. Quantifying risk 
forms part of project risk analysis, which is a process for identifying, measuring, valuing and 
managing risk, and to some degree, anticipating and mitigating the uncertainty associated with 
infrastructure projects. Risk is a dynamic variable, its effects may be cumulative or 
spontaneous and the riskiness of projects increases with complexity and with time. Risk is also 
difficult to forecast and PPP procurement requires government agencies to develop a good 
understanding of risk analysis methods employed in delivering economic and social 
infrastructure services. For example, cost overruns, late delivery and force majeure events are 
risks that may have a negative impact on the contractor’s financial economics or may delay the 
delivery of services to the community. An examination of the history of risk throughout human 
history is provided by Bernstein (1998). The distinction between risk and uncertainty is made in 
Knight, 2006 (a reprint of the original 1921 treatise) and Keynes (1921).  
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Table 2: Typical Public Private Partnership Project Risks 
Risk Category Typical Risks 
Pre-Design Risk Suitability of the output specification 
Development consents, permits and approvals, stakeholder 
consultation 
Tenure, site access and network issues (connectivity to utilities and 
services) 
Site Risk Site conditions, contamination, environmental impact assessment and 
approvals 
Existing buildings 
Design and 
Construction 
Construction time and cost, fitness for purpose, weather, change in 
scope or specification, technology interface, quality of building for life 
cycle cost risk 
Hold-up risk, changes in scope or specification 
Market Risk Risk of insufficient market demand, tariff setting and escalation factors  
Technology Technology failure 
Financial Risk Interest rates, compliance with lender covenants, currency exchange 
rates 
Technology Risk Downtime and third party risk with technology failure 
Operational Risk Life cycle cost risk, repair and maintenance risk, accelerated asset 
deterioration 
Network Risk Access and pricing, regulatory interventions, interface relationship 
management 
Industrial 
Relations 
Delays caused by industrial action 
Political Risk Change of law, tax regulation 
Force Majeure Unanticipated exogenous events such as floods, earthquakes, war and 
riots 
 
The proposals received from contractors will be based on recognition of a number of risks not 
included in the PSC. These may include the risk of government cancellation of the bid process, 
change of taxation and other laws that adversely impact the project and government 
appropriation of assets without fair compensation. Private bidders may need to consider risks 
not normally borne by government such as capital raising and underwriting costs, credit and 
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sovereign risk insurance, expenses related to bond issues, compliance with lender covenants 
regarding financial management, the term of loans, refinancing risk, withholding taxes on foreign 
remittances, interest rate and currency exchange risks. The bidder proposals will include a risk 
acceptance schedule and a unitary or user pays charge based on its risk- weighted costing of 
the PPP project. 
A relatively simple method of risk valuation for infrastructure projects is the qualitative probability 
approach which requires the analyst to identify a risk event, measure the cost of the impact, and 
multiply the cost of the impact by the probability of its occurrence. The formula for risk-weighting 
an expenditure estimate is as follows: 
          Risk weighted cost = Original prime cost + (Cost of a risk event x Probability) 
          Assume a prime cost of $100, a risk that would add $25 to the prime cost if it occurs and 
a 20% probability that it will occur: 
Risk weighted cost = $100 + ($25 x 20%) = $100 + $5 = $105 
The importance of risk-weighting is that it quantifies risk for the purposes of risk allocation and 
preparation of the project budget. 
4.3 Risk Allocation 
Most design and construction risks are well known to construction firms, and form part of the 
day to day management of a construction company. However, risks that the construction 
company may be asked to carry under a PPP contract that are not part of their day to day 
activities, such as project finance risk, operational and life cycle cost risk may be absorbed by 
the company and managed internally or sub-contracted out to others such as insurance 
companies. They may also be rejected by the company in which case the VfM outcome may be 
weakened because of the value placed on risk transfer for the PSC and VfM assessment. Table 
3 summarises the PPP risk allocation responsibility on a typical project identifying some of the 
risks noted earlier in Table 2.  
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Table 3: Typical Public Private Partnership Risk Allocation Schedule 
Risk Category Description Responsibility 
Existing Structures Suitability of existing buildings for use in 
redevelopment 
• Government 
Site Conditions Pre-existing contamination  Construction 
contamination 
• Government                          
Contractor                      
Environmental 
Risk 
Compliance with Environmental Management 
Plan for redevelopment 
• Contractor 
Design Fitness for Purpose • Contractor 
Construction Responsibility for time and cost risk • Contractor 
Industrial Relations Labour disputes and hold-ups • Contractor 
Commissioning
  
Delays and rectification costs • Contractor 
Demand for 
Services 
Derivation of third party revenues • Contractor 
Network Risk Connectivity to supply chain • Contractor 
Life cycle Cost 
Risk 
Responsibility for cost blow-out • Contractor 
Political Risk Change of Tax Law • Government 
Financial Risk Interest and exchange rate risk • Contractor 
Force Majeure Non-insurable calamity • Contractor 
5.0 Informal VfM Assessment 
In some countries, PPP policy may endorse VfM principles without providing specific criteria to 
determine how VfM will be calculated. The reasons for this may be that government needs to 
fast-track projects or the government’s fiscal position limits public investment options. The 
informal assessment of VfM uses systematic approaches to the procurement process that 
embeds VfM principles in project evaluation and procurement methodologies. 
In jurisdictions where a formal VfM process is not required, a comprehensive procurement 
process that embeds VfM principles may achieve a similar outcome. The elements of a VfM 
procurement process include a detailed feasibility or procurement options analysis, a pre-
qualification procedure, competitive dialogue, technical and administrative requirements that 
incorporate quantitative and qualitative performance benchmarks, and adoption of a gateway 
system that prescribes the stages through which a project must pass before it is finally 
approved. Delmon (2009: p. 13) describes this approach as “… a holistic assessment of the 
project delivery and the marginal benefits provided by private investment and the competitive 
procurement process used”. The procurement measures commonly used to improve VfM 
outcomes include: 
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• Comprehensive evaluation of the service needed to guide agency decision-making 
during the investment and procurement stages of the project; 
• The preparation of technical requirements for the project; 
• A framework for the systematic identification, measurement and optimal allocation of risk 
particularly life cycle cost and operational risks, force majeure, finance and construction 
risk; 
• An experienced and well-trained agency PPP project management unit; 
• A two stage bidding process requiring pre-qualification before the request for proposal is 
issued; 
• A competitive bid market; 
• Bidder selection criteria incorporating quantitative components (risk transfer, cost to 
government, technical requirements) and qualitative components (contractor expertise 
and track record, design and construction innovation, early completion). 
 
A PPP policy that adopts most of these principles has a greater likelihood of achieving VfM 
outcomes for government than a PPP policy that does not.  However, informal VfM methods do 
not provide government with sufficient data with which to improve the procurement process, 
document lessons learnt, raise the skill levels in line agencies and optimise risk transfer with 
future projects. These outcomes can only be achieved with the adoption of a formal approach to 
VfM assessment.  
A number of countries use a competitive bid market to enhance VfM outcomes.  The 
competitive bid market approach is based on the assumption that private infrastructure 
procurement delivers projects at lower cost and in shorter periods of time than traditional public 
procurement methods and represent a better VfM option for government. Competition between 
private contractors in a well-managed bid market is considered the one of the key drivers of VfM 
with PPPs (Ismail, et al., 2011).  
VfM is more likely to be produced by a competitive procurement process over one that is not.  
However, competitive bidding alone does not ensure VfM outcomes.  When this option is 
chosen, the government will generally prepare an output specification, consult widely with the 
market ahead of the bid, make an allocation of project risks and proceed with a competitive 
bidding process. This is the practice adopted with many concessions and BOT contracts and it 
relies on a competitive bid market to deliver a better outcome for government than could be 
achieved with traditional procurement, which is widely accepted as the benchmark for 
measuring procurement performance. Unlike a PPP, a traditional contract based on an input 
specification is an adversarial contract and contractor selection employs criteria heavily 
weighted toward lowest cost. Policies that use competitive bid markets rely on bidder depth, 
transaction flow, risk transfer, and rigorous management of the bid process. Procurement 
method is also important and policies may require a minimum number of bidders, pre-
qualification, open or closed bids, and competitive dialogue during negotiations. In some 
jurisdictions, a best and final offer may be requested from short-listed bidders although this may 
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contribute to hold-up delays and rapid escalation of bid costs if not carefully managed. 
Experience in a number of OECD countries suggests that VfM outcomes are determined by the 
efficiency with which government manages the competitive bid process, an appropriate risk 
allocation strategy, and post-selection negotiations to ensure achievement of the best VfM 
outcome (Delmon 2009, pp. 13-15). Most international PPP policy frameworks now require 
competitive bidding for PPP projects. 
6.0 Conclusion 
The PSC is a standard measure for assessing VfM across all disciplines and agencies provides 
a methodology for comparison between proposals. The PSC contains a significant element of 
embodied risk; retained risk by the government or agency, risk-weighted cost of conventional 
procurement, and transferable risk to the contractor. The advantages to government of using a 
PSC is that it develops agency skills and experience in activities such as options analysis, risk-
weighting financial forecasts of projects for risk allocation and management purposes, life cycle 
cost measurement, discounted cash flow analysis of government investment activities, and a 
better understanding of optimal methods for financing major projects. The PSC also requires 
government agencies to take into account the qualitative dimensions of procurement decision-
making including the contractor’s experience and track record, the identification of efficiencies 
through contractor design and construction innovation, and indirect benefits in the form of 
improved productivity, technology transfer, improved services and compliance with international 
environmental and other standards. 
The PSC plays an important role in the evaluation of proposals and the assessment of VfM. 
However, its accuracy depends on the assumptions used to establish costs, and to identify, 
measure and price risk. The PSC should be robust and consistent with the project scope issued 
to bidders (KPMG 2011, p. 2). A review of the international evidence (Regan, et al., 2011) 
suggests PPPs that use the PSC with integrated VfM evaluation criteria are achieving improved 
procurement outcomes for government. This is more prevalent with larger and more complex 
projects that make greater use of risk transfer, innovation, technology, and a competitive bid 
market. International evidence suggests that PPPs are lowering the cost of services to 
government, improving regional economic performance, and are making a significant 
contribution to improved service quality. Examples include reduced in-patient stays and faster 
recovery times in public hospitals, better educational performances in state schools, improved 
efficiency in waste management, water supplies and recycling, better asset utilisation and faster 
delivery of services.  
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